Quem nunca leu Rawls deverá criticá-lo?

There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according to virtue. While it is recognized that this is ideal can never be fully carried out, it is the appropriate conception of distributive justice, at least as a prime facie principle, and society should try to realize it as circumstances permit. (..) the notion of distribution according to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations. Thus it is true that as persons and groups take part in just arrangemento what men ts, they acquire claims on one another defined by the publicly recognized rules. (...= A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institions. But what their are entitle to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrisic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic struture and specify the duties and obligations os individuals do not mention moral desert, and there is not tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it.

John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice

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